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Introduction 
This paper reflects on the procedural role of the Advocate General
1
 in cases referred to the 
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). The role of the Advocate General has an 
impact on the extent to which the right to a fair hearing is ensured in European Union (EU) 
adversarial proceedings.  
It is relevant, in the second instance, to assess the application of the European Court of 
Human Rights’ (ECtHR) external review mechanism to the fair trial obligations simpliciter of 
Contracting States Party to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR).  In contrast, the interpretation by the CJEU
 
of the nature of 
its adversarial proceedings, in which the Advocate General participates prior to that Court’s 
deliberations, the EU not yet a Contracting Party to the ECHR, is examined in section three.  
The evolving nature of the EU and the values upon which it is premised, together with the 
procedural and substantive changes in EU law, require a re-appraisal of the Advocate 
General’s role. The procedural changes to the Statute and Rules of Procedure of the CJEU, 
post Lisbon, receive appraisal in section four, as does the revised EU preliminary ruling 
procedure and, also in context, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.  
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The guarantees offered by the CJEU in discharging its jurisdictional tasks became the subject 
of review by the ECtHR in the case of Kokkelvisserij,
2
  and is considered in the fifth section. 
A key point which is highlighted is the current gap in the protection of fundamental rights in 
the EU, where the acts and omissions of the EU, a non-Contracting Party to the ECHR, are 
involved but not those of an EU Member State (a Contracting Party to the ECHR).  
The impasse in the EU - ECHR accession process is evaluated following the CJEU’s negative 
Opinion as to the compatibility of the draft Accession Agreement with the EU Treaties. To 
conclude, the relationship of the CJEU with the ECHR will be measured, currently and in 
anticipation of future EU accession to the ECHR, regarding conformity of the EU’s 
adversarial procedures with the standards of fairness required by the ECtHR interpreting the 
ECHR. 
A case can be made for a circumscribed right of rejoinder to the Advocate General’s 
submission to exist in matters which have the potential to encroach on the human rights of 
EU citizens. Such reconciliation on the part of the EU with the standards of fairness of the 
ECHR could be a relevant, timely and pre-emptive contribution to the stalled accession 
process, and beyond. 
1. The Procedural Role of the Advocate General  
The CJEU is composed of one judge from each EU Member State and a total of eleven 
Advocates General.
3
  The role and duty of Advocates General is to act with complete 
impartiality and independence, and to make, in open court, reasoned submissions in cases 
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which, in accordance with the Statute of the Court of Justice, require their involvement.
4
 The 
term ‘independence’ relates primarily to independence from the Member States that nominate 
an Advocate General
5
 and from the parties arguing before the Court.
6
 Their independence 
from the internal workings of the rest of CJEU is also the essence of the role of EU 
Advocates General. The role was modelled on the French Commissaire du Gouvernement in 
proceedings before the Conseil d’Etat.7 Their respective roles, however, have evolved 
distinctly; each office belonging to a different legal order. The Court appoints the First 
Advocate General.  As soon as the Judge-Rapporteur in any case has been designated by the 
President,
8
 the first Advocate General assigns a case to an Advocate General.
9
 Since the 
Treaty of Nice came into force in 2003 Advocates General do not give an opinion in every 
case; opinions may be dispensed with in cases which, for example, raise no new point of 
law.
10
 About fifty three per cent of the judgments delivered by the CJEU in 2012 were 
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delivered without an Advocate General’s opinion.11 Regarding references for preliminary 
rulings, acting in accordance with the expedited or urgent preliminary ruling procedures, the 
Statute and Rules of Procedure of the CJEU provide for the case to be heard without an 
Advocate General’s submission.12 
The Advocate General will be present when the CJEU decides procedural but not substantive 
matters. Advocates General and Judges have equal status ‘in deciding the order in which 
cases should be heard,’13 which cases are of exceptional importance warranting a full court 
hearing,
14
 and cases in which no new point of law is raised. Advocates General do not 
participate in the judges’ deliberations; those deliberations are, and must, remain secret.15  
During the oral procedure before the CJEU, the Advocate General is free to ask questions of 
the parties to the proceedings.
16
 The previous Rules of Procedure referred to the Advocate 
General delivering his opinion orally at the end of the oral procedure.
17
 The new Rules 
stipulate that the Advocate General’s opinion is delivered after the close of that hearing,18 the 
President of the CJEU having already declared the close of the hearing after the parties or 
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17
 [2011] OJ C162/17, Article 59(1). Since 1990, only the conclusions are read out in court and not the full 
opinion. Ritter (2005-6), ibid. 753. 
18
 Rules of Procedure 2012, Article 82(1). 
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interveners have given their oral argument.
19
 A clear delineating line symbolises the fact that 
the parties have no right per se to question the Advocate General’s advice to the CJEU, prior 
to the start of the deliberations of the Judges. Former Advocate General, Philippe Léger 
explained that ‘[t]he opinion serves a vital function in assuring the parties that their case has 
been heard and their arguments considered’.20 It is the practice of Advocates General to bring 
some consistency and clarity to EU law;
21
 to warn and to advise as to the direction in which 
they believe EU law should go,
22
 one the Court would be willing to accept. The Advocate 
General’s submission is not legally binding and while it may be intended as advice, the extent 
of any influence from the Advocate General’s submission feeding through into the Court’s 
deliberations may not be ascertainable. The CJEU reaches a majority decision,
23
  which may 
be very stinted and sparse in its reasoning to arrive at its stated outcome.
24
 There is no 
provision for concurring, or for dissenting, judgments on the part of Judges in the CJEU, nor 
is there a right of appeal from that Court’s collegiate decision. It remains the case that 
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Advocates Generals’ ‘opinions sometimes raise issues that were not pleaded by the parties,’25 
to which the parties have no automatic right to respond. This is an unsatisfactory state of 
affairs if the Advocate General wants to rely on that point and even more unsatisfactory if the 
Court subsequently relies on it in its judgment. 
According to the revised Rules of Procedure, the CJEU may at any time, after hearing the 
Advocate General, order the opening or re-opening of the oral part of the procedure, in 
particular if it considers that it lacks sufficient information; or where a party has, after the 
close of that part of the procedure, submitted a new fact which is of such a nature as to be a 
decisive factor for the decision of the CJEU; or where the case must be decided on the basis 
of an argument which has not been debated between the parties or the interested persons 
referred to in Article 23 of the Statute of the CJEU.
26
 Whilst necessary and relevant,
27
 in 
order to inform interested parties of the procedural opportunity to apply to have the oral 
proceedings re-opened, the revised Rules of Procedure do not go far enough. Consolidating 
the dicta of the CJEU in Emesa Sugar,
28
  a case in which the parties were denied the right to 
respond to points raised by the EU Advocate General, the Rules of Procedure allude to the 
CJEU’s discretion to consider whether to re-open the proceedings and do not accord the 
parties a procedural right in this respect, arguably contrary to the principles inherent in the 
right to a fair hearing, as interpreted by the ECtHR.  
2. The ECtHR: Article 6(1) ECHR and National Offices 
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The ECtHR in Strasbourg has adjudicated applications concerning officers in national 
procedures undertaking roles comparable to that of the EU Advocate General, from parties 
seeking the fundamental right to a fair hearing in accordance with Article 6(1) ECHR. Article 
6(1) ECHR provides that in the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any 
criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a 
reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.  It is apparent 
that the ECtHR subjects the role of Member States’ respective offices and adversarial 
procedures to stricter scrutiny
29
 than that given to the office of Advocate General in EU 
adversarial proceedings. A stronger test
30
 is applied to national court officers in relation to the 
requirements needed to establish fairness in court hearings. Three examples are illustrative.  
The case of Vermeulen v Belgium,
31
 concerned the Belgian legal system’s avocat général. 
Vermeulen complained that he had not been able to reply, through his lawyer, to the avocat 
général’s submissions. After scrutiny of the office, the ECtHR considered that the avocat 
général’s submissions contained an opinion which derived its authority from that of the 
procureur général’s department itself. The fact that it was impossible for Vermeulen to reply 
to them before the end of the hearing infringed his right to adversarial proceedings. This fact 
in itself amounted to a breach of Article 6(1) ECHR.
32
 In what has become its classic 
statement of principle for a fair hearing, the ECtHR declared: that right means in principle 
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 M. Bobek, ‘A Fourth in the Court: Why are there Advocates General in the Court of Justice?’ (2011-12) 14 
C.Y.E.L.S. 529, 533. 
30
 Ibid. 
31
 Vermeulen [GC] App. No. 19075/91 (1996) ECHR 1996-I. 
32
 Ibid. para. 33. The breach in question was further aggravated by the avocat général’s participation in the 
court’s deliberations, albeit only in an advisory capacity. A breach of Article 6(1) ECHR was found in this 
respect also. It should be reiterated that the EU Advocate General does not participate in the CJEU’s 
deliberations. 
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the opportunity for the parties to a criminal or civil trial to have knowledge of and comment 
on all evidence adduced or observations filed, even by an independent member of the 
national legal service, with a view to influencing the court’s decision.  
Kress
33
 concerned the role of the French Commissaire du Gouvernement in adversarial 
proceedings before the Conseil d’Etat. The applicant complained, under Article 6 (1) ECHR, 
that she had not had a fair hearing in the administrative proceedings she had brought against 
Strasbourg Hospital. It had been impossible to inspect the submissions of the Commissaire du 
Gouvernement before the hearing or reply to them afterwards because he spoke last. The 
ECtHR reiterated its classic test for the concept of a fair trial,
34
 which is the thread running 
through the Court’s jurisprudence and its essential review criteria pertaining to the right to a 
fair hearing. It was not disputed by the ECtHR in Kress that in the proceedings in the Conseil 
d’Etat lawyers who so wished could ask the Commissaire du Gouvernement, before the 
hearing, to ‘indicate the general tenor’ of his submissions. Nor was it contested that the 
parties may reply to the Commissaire du Gouvernement’s submissions by means of a 
memorandum for the deliberations. Importantly, in the event of the Commissaire du 
Gouvernement raising orally at the hearing a ground not raised by the parties, the presiding 
judge would adjourn the case to enable the parties to present argument on the point.
35
 The 
ECtHR considered that the procedure followed, taken as a whole, afforded litigants sufficient 
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 Kress [GC] App. No. 39594/98, ECHR 2001-VI. 
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safeguards.  No problem arose from the point of view of the right to a fair trial of compliance 
with the principle that proceedings should be adversarial.
36
  
In the case of Martinie v France
37
 the ECtHR considered it necessary to examine the 
application not from the specific standpoint of adversarial process or equality of arms, but 
from the wider angle of an overall assessment of the fairness of the proceedings. The ECtHR 
declared that it had found  a violation not only in respect of the participation, in an advisory 
capacity, of the Advocate-General at the deliberations of the Belgian Court of Cassation 
(see Borgers
38
 and Vermeulen
39
), but also the presence of the Deputy Attorney-General at the 
deliberations of the Portuguese Supreme Court even though he had no consultative or other 
type of vote (see Lobo Machado
40
), and the mere presence of the Advocate-General at the 
deliberations of the Criminal Division of the French Court of Cassation (see Slimane-Kaïd 
(no. 2)
41
). That case-law is largely based on the doctrine of appearances and the fact that, like 
the Commissaire du Gouvernment before the French administrative courts, the Advocates 
General and Attorney-General in question express their view publicly on the case prior to the 
deliberations of the judges.
42
 It is significant that the ECtHR, in Martinie, considered that 
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42
 Martinie v France, para. 53. 
10 
 
there was an imbalance on account of State Counsel’s position in the proceedings: unlike the 
accountant, he was present at the hearing, and, inter alia, could express his own point of view 
orally without being contradicted by the accountant. That imbalance was accentuated by the 
fact that the hearing was not in public and was therefore conduct in the absence of any 
scrutiny either by the accountant concerned or by the public. A breach of Article 6(1) ECHR 
was upheld.
43
 Fundamentally, the ECtHR reiterated that the concept of a fair trial implies in 
principle the right for the parties to have knowledge of and comment on all evidence adduced 
or observations filed, even by an independent member of the national legal service with a 
view to influencing the court’s decision.44 
3. The CJEU: Adversarial Proceedings and the EU Advocate General  
The CJEU ruled on the procedural role of the Advocate General in the case of Emesa 
Sugar,
45
  concerning a reference by a Netherlands’ court for a preliminary ruling in which 
Emesa Sugar sought leave to submit written observations after the Advocate General had 
delivered his Opinion at the hearing. The CJEU distinguished the role of Advocate General 
from that of avocat général in Vermeulen, noting that the Advocate General’s opinion is not, 
in contrast with that of the avocat général, an opinion addressed to the judges or to the parties 
which stems from an authority outside the Court.
46
 Rather, the CJEU declared, it constitutes 
the individual reasoned opinion, expressed in open court, of a judicial member of the Court 
itself; the Advocate General taking part, publicly and individually, in the process by which 
that Court reaches its judgment, and in carrying out the judicial function entrusted to it. The 
                                                          
43
 Ibid. paras. 45, 46, 50. 
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 Case C-17/98, Emesa Sugar (Free Zone) NV v. Aruba, Order [2000] ECR I 665. 
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 Judgment in Vermeulen v Belgium, para. 31. 
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Court was careful to add that the opinion is published together with the Court’s judgment. 
The case law of the ECtHR on the role of an avocat général did not appear to the CJEU to be 
transposable to the Opinion of the EU Advocate General.
47
 
The CJEU stated, pragmatically, that given the special constraints, inherent in EU judicial 
procedure, connected in particular with its language regime, to confer on the parties the right 
to submit observations in response to the opinion of the Advocate General, with a 
corresponding right for the other parties, (particularly in preliminary rulings) to reply to those 
observations, would cause serious difficulties and considerably extend the length of the 
procedure.
48
 The Court recognised that constraints inherent in the manner in which the 
administration of justice is organised within the Union cannot justify infringing a 
fundamental right to adversarial procedure. No such situation arose in EU law, the CJEU 
ruled, in that with a view to the very purpose of adversarial procedure, which is to prevent the 
CJEU from being influenced by arguments which the parties have been unable to discuss, 
that Court may of its own motion, on a proposal from the Advocate General or at the request 
of the parties, re-open the oral procedure, in accordance with its Rules of Procedure. The 
CJEU gave its interpretation as to the circumstances in which this might be possible, namely 
if that Court considers that it lacks sufficient information or that the case must be dealt with 
on the basis of an argument which has not been debated between the parties.
49
  In a sparsely 
reasoned ruling the CJEU declared that Emesa’s application did not relate to the re-opening 
of the oral procedure nor did it rely on any specific factor indicating that it would be either 
useful or necessary to do so.
50
 It only related to a request to submit written comments on the 
                                                          
47
 Emesa Sugar, paras. 14 -16. 
48
 Ibid. para. 17. 
49
 Ibid. para. 18. 
50
 Ibid. para. 19. 
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Advocate General’s Opinion. The CJEU dismissed Emesa’s application to respond to the 
Advocate General’s Opinion, which did not exist as of right according to the Court’s Statute 
and Rules of Procedure.
51
 The outcome of this case does not shed a good light on the 
intentions of the CJEU to exercise its discretion on the merits of a case to re-open the oral 
proceedings.  
Subsequent to Emesa Sugar, and to the ECtHR case of Kress, the CJEU in Arben Kaba
52
 was 
seized of a question referred for preliminary ruling, which concerned directly the extent to 
which the procedure before the EU judicature, which does not confer on the parties any 
absolute right to challenge the opinion of the Advocate General, complies adequately with the 
requirements of the ECHR as interpreted by the ECtHR.
53
  It was not necessary for the CJEU 
to reply to this question,
54
 though Advocate General Colomer provided some indications of 
the way in which the CJEU ensures compliance with Article 6(1) ECHR in a procedural 
context. 
Confirming the CJEU’s ruling in Emesa Sugar, he stated that the organic and functional link 
between Advocates General and the CJEU of which they are members, meant that the 
requirements of adversarial procedure were not applicable to them.
55
 He noted that in the 
interest of the very objective of the adversarial process, namely to prevent the CJEU from 
                                                          
51
 Ibid. para. 20. On appeal by Emesa Sugar to the ECtHR, in Emesa Sugar NV v The Netherlands, App. No. 
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Advocate General to the CJEU. The ECtHR declared the application inadmissible for other unrelated reasons. 
52
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53
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being influenced by arguments on which the parties have not had the opportunity to 
comment, the CJEU may of its own motion, on a proposal from the Advocate General or at a 
request of the parties, re-open the oral procedure, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure, 
if it considers that it lacks sufficient information or that the case must be dealt with on the 
basis of an argument which has not been debated between the parties.
56
  Advocate General 
Colomer added that, in practice, any written submissions lodged by the parties after delivery 
of the opinion, are considered by the Advocate General, the Judge-Rapporteur and the 
President of the bench, with a view to examining whether they may be regarded as an 
application for the re-opening of the oral procedure.
57
  
The fact that written submissions may be regarded as an application for re-opening the oral 
hearing is no substitute for the inclusion in the Rules of Procedure of certain specified 
objective criteria, known by parties in advance of the oral hearing and the CJEU’s 
consequential deliberations, which will constitute grounds on which the CJEU’s decision to 
re-open the oral proceedings will be based. These are necessary criteria in order to ensure 
legal certainty and transparency, to dispel any doubts that may ensue of the potential for 
arbitrary decisions to be taken based on the objectives and interest of the EU legal order, and 
not the interest of fairness to individual parties before the CJEU. 
Corroborating Emesa Sugar,
58
 in that constraints inherent in the manner in which the 
administration of justice is organised within the Union cannot justify infringing a 
fundamental right to adversarial procedure, Advocate General Colomer explained that those 
constraints also pursue legitimate objectives designed to ensure the administration of justice 
within a reasonable time in the EU context; consequently, it is at least legitimate to weigh up 
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 Emesa Sugar, para. 18. 
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 Kaba, points 107, 108. 
58
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all the interests at stake; to consider the concrete repercussions flowing from the introduction 
of a given procedural requirement.
59
 An equitable balance between expediency and fairness 
should be attained; the EU has not attained this. Grounds of expediency, albeit in a sui 
generis EU legal order, may no longer stand up to scrutiny by the ECtHRs’ review 
mechanism, whether it be full review or deference in relation to the EU, after the Lisbon 
Treaty for reasons given below.  
The justification given by Advocate General Colomer can be disputed. He stated that were 
the parties to be allowed the last word in the procedure, the Advocate General would be 
prevented from performing the function assigned to him, since in order for him to be able 
effectively to carry out the analysis required of him in the performance of his task of assisting 
the ECJ to guarantee observance of the law, he must have at his disposal all the information, 
arguments and details available to those who are to give final judgment in the case.
60
 The 
parties would not have ‘the last word’, since the Advocate General’s opinion would follow 
pursuant to the re-opened oral proceedings. 
He reasoned that Advocates General, knowing that their respective opinion would be the 
subject of a response from the parties, would inevitably take their reactions into account 
when drafting it, and would not therefore deliver it ‘with complete impartiality and 
independence’ as required by the Treaties. Disagreement has been voiced in respect of this 
‘pessimistic’61 view. Schiemann expressed his concern that ‘[i]t can happen that an Opinion 
canvasses something which was not argued either in the written material or at the Hearing. 
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60
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There is undoubtedly something to be said in such a case for giving the parties a chance to 
comment on this point.’ He also cautioned that ‘[t]here are strong practical considerations 
related to further expenditure of time and money which militate against this being done save 
in the rarest of cases’.62  
A case can be made for the fact that a procedural right of rejoinder to the Advocate General’s 
submission, while not existing as of right generally in every case, should exist in certain 
defined cases. Particularly as the EU’s areas of competence move beyond that of an 
economic entity to one in which the CJEU increasingly will be asked to interpret substantive 
EU law potentially affecting the human rights of its citizens.  
4. Procedural and Substantive Changes in EU Law 
In order to ameliorate the Luxembourg Court’s increasing workload, the Statute and Rules of 
Procedure of the CJEU introduced an accelerated procedure, renamed ‘expedited 
procedure’,63 in references for preliminary rulings, and an urgent preliminary ruling 
procedure
64
 (PPU) relating to the area of freedom, security and justice. In respect of each of 
these procedures the Court’s Statute provides in derogation from its standard procedure, that 
the case may proceed to deliberation in the CJEU without an Advocate General’s 
submission.
65
 The Rules of Procedure
66
 provide for the CJEU to rule after hearing the 
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Advocate General, without mention of an Advocate General’s submission or opinion. The 
rationale was not one that depended on the case raising no new point of law; but one where 
the urgency of the case was such that it warranted an expedited or urgent procedure.
67
  
A letter to the CJEU, signed by an influential group of academics, raised the point that the 
absence of publication of the Advocate General’s prise de position risked failing to comply 
with the right to a fair hearing and the standards of the ECHR. This public aspect of the 
Advocate General’s role was deemed a significant safeguard in adversarial proceedings by 
the CJEU in Emesa Sugar. Both the expedited procedure and PPU were the subjects of 
concern for the reason that the Advocate General’s prior submission was relinquished,68 and 
there was no longer a published Advocate General’s opinion in the public domain in areas 
impinging on the interests of the parties.
69
 The CJEU has since resorted in practice to 
publishing what has become known as the View
70
 of the Advocate General in expedited and 
urgent preliminary rulings, albeit after the CJEU’s deliberation and the outcome of the case. 
Retaining the publication of the Advocate General’s advice,71 was one early example of 
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 Recommendations to national courts and tribunals in relation to the initiation of preliminary ruling 
proceedings [2012] OJ C338/1, 39, 40. 
68
 The first case heard under the accelerated/expedited procedure, Case C-189/01 Jippes [2001] ECR I 5689 and 
a subsequent case undertaken in accordance with the PPU, Case C-388/08 PPU, Artur Leymann and Aleksei 
Pustovarov [2008] ECR I 8993, exist with a published judgment only; without the published View of the 
Advocate General. 
69
 Barnard (2009) above n. 64, 287, 293, 296. 
70
 See point 6 of Advocate General Bot’s View in Case C-403/09 PPU, Jasna Detiček v Maurizio Sgueglia 
[2009] ECR I 12193.  
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 The Advocate General’s view was later published after the CJEU had delivered its judgment in Case C-
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expedited, preliminary ruling procedure. See Barnard (2009) above n. 64. The Views of Advocates General 
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deference by the EU, and more specifically the CJEU, so as to ensure compatibility with the 
ECHR right to a fair hearing.  
 
 
The apparent practice of the Advocate General preparing a prise de position,
72
 delivered after 
the end of the oral proceedings, should be stated to be a prior requirement in the formal rules 
of the Court. The CJEU ‘hears’ the Advocate General; those ‘outline’ views should also be 
available to the parties, before the CJEU decides the outcome of the case.
73
 The situation can 
no longer be sustained post Lisbon when the substantive areas in which the reasoned 
submissions of the Advocate General are no longer stated to be forthcoming as a matter of 
course are those that have the potential to affect the human rights of EU citizens. Questions 
referred for preliminary ruling under the PPU have, for example, concerned jurisdiction and 
the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters, matters of parental 
responsibility and the interests of the child;
74
 and criminal proceedings against parties 
accused of a serious narcotics offence, the European arrest warrant and surrender procedures 
between Member States.
75
  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Sharpston in Rinau (C-195/08 PPU Rinau) and Kokott in Goicoechea (C-296/08 PPU Santesteban Goicoechea) 
were not available when the judgments were delivered, P. Koutrakos, ‘Speeding up the preliminary reference 
procedure – fast but not too fast’, Editorial (2008) E.L.R. 617, 618. These were published subsequently. 
72
 Case C-66/08 Criminal Proceedings against Szymon Kozłowski [2008] ECR I 6041. It appeared to Advocate 
General Bot, ‘necessary to present in writing the reasoning underlying the answers that [he planned] to propose 
to the Court’. Point 8 of his View delivered on 28 April 2008. 
73
 Sharpston (2008) above n. 1, 29, 30. 
74
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75
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It will not be necessary for the Member States to initiate primary Treaty changes to the 
adversarial system to ensure convergence with the human rights standards for a fair hearing 
as interpreted by the ECtHR, in matters of EU law.  The EU internal rules have relieved 
Advocates General of their key role. The EU institutions, acting in accordance with the 
Treaties, have the competence to amend the Statute
 76
 and the Rules of Procedure
77
 of the 
CJEU. 
The Lisbon Treaty has merged the former first and third pillars of the EU; the interpretive 
preliminary ruling jurisdiction of the CJEU extends to the area of freedom, security and 
justice, inclusive of certain criminal issues, the five year transitional period
78
 having 
transpired. This may lead to an increase in the number of preliminary references required to 
engage with the PPU. The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (EUCFR),
79
 accorded 
legal force, as a result of the Lisbon Treaty,
80
 will engender an increase in preliminary rulings 
on substantive human rights issues, leading De Búrca to advocate that the CJEU ‘should, 
particularly in cases involving human rights claims, rethink its increasingly frequent practice 
of dispensing with the Opinion of an Advocate General’.81 She suggested that the CJEU 
ought to defer to the expertise and experience of the Strasbourg Court and refer to the case 
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 Article 6 (1) TEU, w.e.f. 1 December 2009. 
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law and standards of the latter when interpreting the standard of human rights of the EU 
under the EUCFR.
82
  
Procedurally, Article 47 of the EUCFR provides that everyone whose rights and freedoms 
guaranteed by the law of the Union are violated has the right to an effective remedy before a 
tribunal in compliance with the conditions laid down in this Article. Everyone is entitled to a 
fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal 
established by law. … . Article 47 EUCFR being the EU counterpart to Article 6(1) ECHR, 
Lenaerts has explained that ‘the protection offered by [Article 47] is more extensive since it 
guarantees the right to an effective remedy before a court’.83 This is important for the CJEU 
when interpreting EU law, inter alia, on the right to a fair hearing vis à vis Article 6(1) 
ECHR, in the interests of protecting the individual human rights of EU citizens.   
5. The ECtHR: Article 6(1) ECHR and EU Procedure  
For the first time, in Kokkelvisserij,
84
 the ECtHR was invited to pronounce on adversarial 
proceedings in the CJEU in which the Advocate General participates in a reference for a 
preliminary ruling from a national court.
85
 The applicant association complained to the 
ECtHR under Article 6(1) ECHR that its right to adversarial proceedings had been violated as 
a result of the refusal of the CJEU to allow it to respond to the Opinion of the Advocate 
General before that Court gave its preliminary ruling.  The applicant had requested to submit 
written remarks in reply to the Opinion of the Advocate General, or, alternatively, for an 
order for the re-opening of the earlier oral proceedings, or to be granted the opportunity 
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otherwise to revisit the Opinion. Recalling that the Statute and the Rules of Procedure of the 
CJEU did not provide for parties to submit observations in reply to the opinion of the 
Advocate General, and citing Emesa Sugar, reiterating its review criteria, the CJEU did not 
order the re-opening of the oral proceedings finding that the applicant association had 
submitted no precise information which made it appear either useful or necessary to do so.
86
 
The ECtHR noted Vermeulen and the fact that it had expressed itself in similar terms in other 
judgments; but stated that it did not follow that it would be bound to find a violation of 
Article 6(1) ECHR by the Netherlands
87
 because the applicant association lacked an 
opportunity to respond to the Advocate General’s Opinion in the CJEU. The ECtHR 
considered that the responsibility of Netherlands as a respondent Party was engaged as a 
result of its courts actively seeking a preliminary ruling from the CJEU. The ECtHR noted 
the nexus between the referring national court and the authoritative interpretation given to EU 
law by the CJEU, which the national court could not ignore. The ECtHR then applied the 
Bosphorus
88
 presumption, declaring that as a corollary, this presumption of equivalent 
protection to that afforded by the ECHR applied not only to actions taken by a Contracting 
Party but also to the procedures followed within such an international organisation itself and, 
in particular, to the procedures of the CJEU. The presumption could be rebutted only if, in 
the circumstances of a particular case, it could be considered that the protection of 
Convention rights was manifestly deficient. 
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The ECtHR considered whether the procedure before the CJEU was accompanied by 
guarantees which ensured equivalent protection of the applicant’s rights. In that respect, it 
gave weight to the possibility offered by the Rules of Procedure of the CJEU– a possibility 
which must be accepted as realistic and not merely theoretical
89– to order the re-opening of 
the oral proceedings after the Advocate General has delivered his opinion, if it finds it 
necessary to do so. It gave weight also to the fact that a request for such re-opening submitted 
by one of the parties to the proceedings is considered on its merits. The ECtHR also noted 
that the national court, which had originally referred the case, could have submitted a further 
request for a preliminary ruling to the CJEU if it had found itself unable to decide the case 
based on the first ruling. The ECtHR presumed the EU to have an equivalent procedural 
system for the protection of the right to a fair hearing. The procedures of the CJEU in a 
reference for a preliminary ruling were not manifestly deficient so as to rebut that 
presumption and the Netherlands was not in violation of Article 6(1) ECHR. 
Such a deferential standard of review cannot be unconditional and reciprocal deference is 
called for on the part of the EU to the standards of the ECHR as interpreted by the ECtHR; 
the situation having become all the more problematic in the light of the dicta of the CJEU in 
Opinion 2/13 on EU Accession to the ECHR, considered below.  
It is also necessary to consider the instance in which the EU has sole responsibility, i.e. where 
there is no involvement on the part of a Member State of the EU, and where the EU is still 
not a Contracting Party to the ECHR. This ‘gap’ situation arose in the case of Connolly,90 a 
staff case pursued through the EU Courts.  Having been denied a reply to the opinion of the 
Advocate General in the CJEU’s proceedings, Connolly, a former employee of the European 
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 In light of an opinion delivered by Advocate General Sharpston in Case C-212/06 Gouvernement de la 
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Commission, applied to the ECtHR alleging a violation of Article 6(1) ECHR.
91
 In these 
proceedings involving the EU institutions only, the ECtHR ruled as inadmissible the 
application relating to the inability to reply to the Advocate General on the simple basis that 
the EU was not a Contracting Party to the ECHR. There was no action or jurisdiction with 
which to link any contracting party. The ECtHR will have to rule directly on this situation if 
and when the EU becomes a Contracting Party to the ECHR and subject to the jurisdiction of 
the ECtHR, if procedures before the CJEU ‘deviate from the case law of the Court of Human 
Rights.’92  
A subsequent decision of the ECtHR in the case of Gasparini,
93
 involving not the EU but the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), was solely based on what was deemed to be a 
‘structural lacuna’ in the international organisation’s internal procedural dispute resolution 
mechanism.
94
 Although there was no State action or intervention, (as there was in 
Kokkelvisserij) the ECtHR did review the procedures before the NATO Appeals Board before 
it deemed there not to be a manifest deficiency sufficient so as to rebut the presumption of 
equivalent protection.
95
 Lock,
96
 writing after Gasparini, critically analysed the ECtHR’s 
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decision of inadmissibility in Connolly, commenting that the inability of parties to reply to 
the Advocate General’s submission constitutes such a structural deficiency in the CJEU’s 
procedures, of the kind which was found in Gasparini, to have justified review by the 
ECtHR. The ECtHR, in Gasparini, may have subjected another international organisation to 
a more stringent review than that to which the EU is subject.  
In application to the EU directly, after its proposed accession to the ECHR, the potential 
exists for the ECtHR to categorise the Statute and Rules of Procedure of the CJEU as 
constituting structural lacunae in the EU’s internal dispute-settlement mechanism. The 
potential also exists, in the event that the EU reviews the CJEU’s Statute and Rules of 
Procedure, for the ECtHR to continue to defer to the EU, it being a sui generis legal order and 
not solely an international organisation subject to the ECtHRs’ full review mechanism in 
matters of procedure. The likelihood is that the procedural rules and practice of the CJEU will 
be more astutely scrutinised for compliance with Article 6(1) ECHR. There is absolutely no 
guarantee that the presumption of equivalence will continue to apply as and when the EU 
becomes a Contracting Party to the ECHR, or even before, should that event be forestalled, as 
is now the situation.
 
 
6. EU-ECHR Accession Stalled 
The EU institutions have a Treaty mandate
97
 to accede to the ECHR;
98
 subject to the legal 
instruments of accession preserving the specific characteristics of the Union and Union law, 
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 T. Lock, ‘Beyond Bosphorus: the European Court of Human Rights’ Case Law on the Responsibility of 
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H.R.L.R. 529, 535.  
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ensuring that accession does not affect the competences of the EU or the powers of its 
institutions and, in particular, the interpretive autonomy of the CJEU.
99
 The EU has been 
careful to establish safeguard criteria in relation to accession, inclusive of preserving its 
interpretive autonomy,
100
 and with particular regard to the mechanisms necessary to ensure 
that proceedings by non-Member States and individual applications would correctly be 
addressed to Member States and/or the Union as appropriate.
101
 The co-respondent 
mechanism was deemed to be facilitative of the EU
102
 and Member States,
103
 respectively, 
joining as co-respondent parties, in order to reflect the sui generis nature of the EU legal 
order.
104 
It was envisaged that the co-respondent mechanism would be applied only in a 
limited number of cases,
105
 one such instance being the situation that arose in 
Kokkelviserij.
106
 Also, in the event that an application was made directly to the ECtHR, the 
Member State in question having not referred a question for a preliminary ruling to the CJEU, 
it was contemplated that the prior involvement mechanism agreed in the draft Accession 
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Agreement
107
 would be instigated and that this would enable the CJEU in the first instance, 
where it had not previously ruled on the provision of EU law in question, to assess the 
compatibility of that provision with the Convention rights at issue, this being deemed 
necessary in order to preserve the autonomy of EU law and that of the CJEU.
 108
  
The CJEU rejected the ‘agreement envisaged’109 as being incompatible with Article 6(2) TEU 
and Protocol No. 8, and therefore the EU’s accession to the ECHR.110 This it did on a number 
of grounds,
111
 according to which accession would be liable to upset the underlying balance 
of the EU and undermine the autonomy of EU law. The CJEU declared the agreement 
envisaged incompatible with the Treaties in that it would be liable to affect Article 344 TFEU 
in so far as it does not preclude the possibility of disputes between Member States or between 
Member States and the EU concerning the application of the ECHR within the scope ratione 
materiae of EU law being brought before the ECtHR.
 
The fact that Member States or the EU 
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109
 Final Report to the CDDH (including the draft agreement on the accession of the EU to the ECHR), 
Appendix I, 47+1(2013) 008 rev 2, Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 10 June 2013. 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/hrpolicy/Accession/Meeting_reports/47_1(2013)008rev2_EN.pdf  . 
110
 Opinion 2/13 of the Court (Full Court), 18 December 2014, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document-
_print.jsf?doclang=EN&text=&pageIn...   A positive opinion of the CJEU is required as to the compatibility 
with the EU Treaties of a draft Accession Agreement of the EU to the ECHR before the accession process can 
proceed,
 
Article 218(11) TFEU. 
111
 Justice cannot be done to the wider international implications of the Court’s Opinion, nor, substantively, to 
its impact on the protection of human rights in Europe, within the necessary constraints of this article. 
26 
 
would be able to submit an application to the ECtHR
112
 would ‘be liable in itself’ to 
undermine the monopoly of interpretation of EU law by the CJEU.
 113
  
Advocate General Kokott114 was more nuanced in her focus on the constitutional significance 
of the EU’s accession to the ECHR and the added value that would ensue for the enhanced 
protection of fundamental rights in Europe. She saw nothing in the draft agreement or 
accompanying documents that might indicate a curtailment of the competences of the EU in 
the context of accession to the ECHR;
115
 it being inevitable that in its judgments the ECtHR 
must examine the national law of the contracting parties concerned, in so far as this is 
necessary in order for it to determine a complaint that fundamental rights as guaranteed by 
the ECHR have been violated.
116
 It is with a view to ensuring that the powers of the Courts of 
the EU are maintained on such occasions, she continued, that Article 3(6) of the draft 
agreement establishes the prior involvement procedure.  
It will be recalled that under that procedure, in proceedings pending before the ECtHR to 
which the EU is a co-respondent, the CJEU is to be afforded sufficient time to assess the 
compatibility with the ECHR of a provision of EU law, in so far as it has not yet made such 
an assessment.
117
 Advocate General Kokott noted that the question whether the CJEU has 
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already expressed a view on the compatibility with the ECHR of a provision of EU law will 
be of decisive importance as regards the initiation of the prior involvement procedure. She 
cautioned that there may be borderline cases in which, notwithstanding the fact that the CJEU 
may have previously considered the provision of EU law concerned, it remains unclear 
whether it has already commented sufficiently on the compatibility of that provision with the 
fundamental right protected by the ECHR, violation of which is now alleged in the 
proceedings before the ECtHR and whether in general terms it examined this compatibility 
from the same legal aspects  as those now relevant in the proceedings before the ECtHR.
118
 
If, in such borderline cases, the decision regarding the necessity of the prior involvement of 
the CJEU were to be left to the ECtHR alone, Advocate General Kokott stated, it would be 
incompatible with the autonomy of EU law, since ultimately the CJEU itself is the only 
reliable authority on whether it has previously dealt with the specific legal issue before the 
ECtHR regarding the compatibility of a particular provision of EU law with one or more 
fundamental rights protected by the ECHR.
119
 In her view, and corroborating the CJEU’s 
Opinion in this regard, ‘in order to respect the principle of autonomy of the EU legal order 
and to preserve the jurisdiction of the CJEU, it is necessary to ensure that, in the event of any 
doubt, the ECtHR will always carry out the prior involvement procedure in accordance with 
Article 3(6) of the draft agreement.’120 She added that the ECtHR may dispense with the prior 
involvement of the Court of Justice only when it is obvious that the Courts of the EU have 
already dealt with the specific legal issue raised by the application pending before the 
ECtHR. She stipulated that clarification to that effect is, in her view, indispensable, and must 
be binding under international law, so as to ensure that the autonomy of the EU legal order is 
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unaffected in the light of the prior involvement procedure. She drew a comparison with the 
procedural law of the EU concerning the preliminary ruling procedure.
121
  
This would not appear to be as unequivocal pronouncement as that of the CJEU in its 
Opinion asserting that it is only the CJEU that can make that assessment of such a definitive 
determination of EU law, whose decision must bind the ECtHR.
122
 Advocate General Kokott 
affirmed the CJEU’s interpretive jurisprudence concerning the third paragraph of Article 267 
TFEU. This underlines, procedurally, the need for the decisive criteria as to whether the 
CJEU had previously ruled on a provision of EU law so as to trigger the prior involvement 
procedure or not, to be determined by the CJEU, which would render a re-negotiated draft 
accession agreement in this respect to be a viable proposition.  
It will be reiterated that the interpretation of the role of the Advocate General in EU 
Adversarial proceedings by the CJEU in Emesa Sugar led to it stating that the reasoning of 
the ECtHR did not appear to be transposable to the EU office of Advocate General. The 
CJEU did have the opportunity further to rule on the direct question of the compatibility with 
Article 6(1) ECHR of the lack of the ability to be able to respond to the Advocate General’s 
Opinion, in Kaba, which was not engaged with by the Luxembourg Court, it not being 
necessary to the outcome of the case. The result of the CJEU’s internal rules derogating from 
the role of the Advocate General to deliver a reasoned submission in open Court, in cases 
capable of affecting the human rights of EU citizens, would now give rise to a subsequent 
need for the CJEU to give a definitive ruling on such a question of compatibility in the event 
that the question arises in proceedings brought before the ECtHR post EU accession to the 
ECHR. This also underlines the necessity of having a secure communication procedure in 
place in the Council of Europe in order to notify the CJEU of the application raised. 
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Advocate General Kokott proposed a viable solution in so far as a final decision of the EU
123
 
gives rise to a finding by the ECtHR that the ECHR has been violated, when it may, in certain 
cases, become necessary to re-open the relevant judicial proceedings.
124
 The EU’s internal 
rule making procedures, and, in particular, resort to the ordinary legislative procedure in 
order to amend the Statute of the CJEU, together with any accompanying amendments to the 
Court’s Rules of Procedure relating to an application for revision of a judgment of the 
CJEU,
125
 are all that need to be engaged with, so as to ensure the compatibility of the draft 
accession agreement with EU law in this instance, which would ‘not be in the nature of a 
constitutional change’ 126  The EU and CJEU can and should exercise deference to the 
standards of a fair trial required by the ECtHR interpreting the ECHR and pre-empt this 
potential eventuality.
127
 
EU-ECHR Relationship: Concluding Comments 
It is recommended that the EU revisit the question of the right of rejoinder to the Advocate 
General’s submission in the interests of upholding the standards for a fair trial in accordance 
with the ECHR as interpreted by the ECtHR. This is so having regard to the evolving values 
on which the EU is premised; the ability under the Statute and Rules of Procedure of the 
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CJEU to derogate from the role of the Advocate General to deliver his submission in open 
court prior to the Court’s deliberations and its final decision; and the current situation 
regarding the accession of the EU to the ECHR. This is essential now that the EUCFR, 
housing substantive human rights for EU citizens, is legally binding and ripe for 
interpretation by the CJEU. Expediency versus fairness should not be the overarching 
characteristic of the EU adjudication system entitling the EU to dispense with the rules of a 
fair hearing in those cases with the potential to violate a party’s human rights.  
The outcome of Opinion 2/13 in terms of the relationship between the CJEU and the ECtHR, 
pending EU accession,  will not become apparent until applications arise in which the ECtHR 
will be asked to return judgment as to the equivalence of the protection afforded by the EU 
legal system with the standards of ECHR. As the ECtHR declared in Bosphorus, ‘any such 
finding of equivalence could not be final and would be susceptible to review in the light of 
any relevant change to fundamental rights protection.’128 The preoccupation of the CJEU 
with the protection of its own prerogatives, namely the autonomous legal order of the EU 
cocooned from the external control mechanism of the ECHR and the standards of human 
rights pertaining in Europe as interpreted by the ECtHR, to the detriment of the individual 
human rights of EU citizens, may be the catalyst that will serve to rebut the presumption of 
equivalent protection accorded to the EU by the ECtHR.  
Pending accession, the protection gap will persist in which there is no Contracting Party 
involvement, solely the acts or omissions of the EU, as outlined in Connelly and where, 
currently, the ECtHRs’ jurisprudence on the right to a fair hearing does not directly apply. 
Hence the importance of the re-negotiations necessary to put the accession process back on 
track. It can be said, optimistically, that the suggestions articulated by Advocate General 
                                                          
128
 Above n. 88, para. 155. 
31 
 
Kokott do offer solutions to the current impasse by way of amendment to the EU’s internal 
rules, and feasible renegotiation of the draft accession agreement so as to ensure that the 
autonomy of the EU legal order and that of the CJEU is preserved, while also ensuring that 
the balance shifts in the EU so as to maintain the Treaty mandated protection of human 
rights.  
It should continue to be contemplated that the prospective EU accession to the ECHR will 
lead to greater scrutiny of the CJEU’s internal procedural rules by the ECtHR in direct 
application of Convention standards to a Contracting Party. It is also within contemplation 
that the sui generis nature of the EU legal order, which is what the CJEU considers it to be, 
will receive due deference by the ECtHR, but not to the detriment of EU citizens denied a 
right of rejoinder, and also prior recourse, to the Advocate General’s submission. There is a 
case to be made for the EU to revisit its internal rules, specifically the Statute and Rules of 
Procedure of the CJEU. This it should do separately to, and also consistently with, the 
accession process.  
 
